GHSA-5h9v-837x-m97r: FlowiseAI: Dataset create+update mass-assignment allows cross-workspace dataset takeover
Summary
Type: Mass assignment via Object.assign(entity, body) -> client-controlled workspaceId (and on create, id) overwritten on the Dataset entity -> cross-workspace data takeover and IDOR.
File: packages/server/src/services/dataset/index.ts
Root cause: The Dataset controller/service constructs a new Dataset() and copies the request body into it via Object.assign(...) without an explicit field allowlist. The request body therefore can include workspaceId, id, createdDate, updatedDate. The server only rebinds *some* of these after the assign (e.g. on create, it overwrites workspaceId but not id; on update, it overwrites id but not workspaceId). The remaining client-controlled values land directly on the persisted row, breaking workspace isolation. Same root pattern as the dataset entity's sibling controllers and as DocumentStore before it was patched in commit 840d2ae.
Affected Code
File: packages/server/src/services/dataset/index.ts
// create (line 203) and update (line 226)
Object.assign(newDataset, body) // <-- BUG: body.id, body.workspaceId accepted
Why it's wrong: Object.assign(target, source) copies every own enumerable property of source onto target. The TypeORM/SQL persistence layer below it does not strip ownership-bearing columns, so workspaceId set in the request body lands as the new workspaceId of the persisted row. The DocumentStore patch (commit 840d2ae) demonstrated the intended fix shape (explicit field-by-field allowlist) but it has not been applied to this entity.
Exploit Chain
1. Attacker is an authenticated member of workspace A. They have a session cookie / JWT for the Flowise web UI. State at this point: attacker can read and write entities scoped to workspace A.
2. Attacker creates a dataset in workspace A via the documented API (or reuses an existing one they own). They note its entity id.
3. Attacker issues a PUT /api/v1/datasets/<id> (or equivalent endpoint) with a JSON body that includes "workspaceId": "<workspace-B-id>" (an arbit
Details
Original advisory: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5h9v-837x-m97r
Exploitation outlook
EPSS (FIRST.org) estimates each CVE’s probability of exploitation in the next 30 days — here is the CSIRTS.com read on those numbers.
- Low exploitation riskCVE-2026-464770.34% 30-day exploitation probability — currently an unlikely target, but scores change as exploit code circulates. Riskier than 26% of all scored CVEs.
Referenced CVEs
| CVE | CSIRTS overview | External |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-46477 | coverage & exploitation status | NVD · CVE.org |
More from GitHub Security Advisories
- criticalGHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8: TSDProxy: Internal proxy auth token forwarded to backend services enables management API …2026-07-10
- highGHSA-fpg8-7664-jc5q: melange: Incomplete package integrity verification allows data section substitution2026-07-10
- mediumGHSA-48rx-c7pg-q66r: Excon does not redact additional sensitive/risky headers when following redirects2026-07-10
- highGHSA-h4g2-xfmw-q2c9: Clauster: Non-loopback deployments can serve the dashboard unauthenticated when auth.enab…2026-07-10
- mediumGHSA-rqq5-2gf9-4w4q: Secure Headers: CSP directive injection via sandbox, plugin_types, and report_to when giv…2026-07-10