GHSA-86cx-wwf4-phq4: OpenList: Arbitrary File Read via Path Prefix Confusion in Share Creation API
Summary
An authorization bypass vulnerability exists in the file sharing mechanism of Openlist. Due to a flawed, non-separator-aware path validation check, an authenticated user can create share links for files outside their restricted base directory. This allows an attacker to bypass tenant/user isolation and gain unauthorized read access to arbitrary files within the system.
Details
When a user attempts to create or update a file share, the application must verify that the requested file path falls within the user's assigned BasePath. However, in server/handles/sharing.go, this authorization check relies on a simple string prefix function: strings.HasPrefix(requested_path, user.BasePath).
Because strings.HasPrefix does not account for directory separators (e.g., /), an attacker whose BasePath is assigned to /base can supply a target path like /base2/secret_document.txt. The validation strings.HasPrefix("/base2/secret_document.txt", "/base") evaluates to true, successfully passing the authorization filter.
Once the share is created, the public share download/list handlers unwrap and serve the file based on the stored absolute path without re-verifying the creator's current directory scope, granting the attacker horizontal access to unauthorized data.
PoC
Prerequisites:
1. A system with at least two distinct directories at the root level: /base and /base2.
2. A sensitive file exists at /base2/secret.txt.
3. An attacker account with the CanShare permission enabled and its Base path strictly limited to /base.
Exploitation Steps:
1. Log in as the attacker account and obtain the JWT authorization token.
2. Send a POST request to create a new share, intentionally targeting the unauthorized sibling directory /base2:
POST /api/share/create HTTP/1.1
Host: <your-openlist-host>
Authorization: <attacker-jwt-token>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"files": ["/base2/secret.txt"],
"pwd": "",
"max_accessed": 0
}
Observe the bypass: The API accepts the request and responds
Details
Original advisory: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-86cx-wwf4-phq4
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