GHSA-hp74-gm6m-2qm5: Pocket ID has a reauthentication bypass via one-time access token login — passkey step-up requirement defeated by JWT freshness check that accepts any login method
Reauthentication Bypass via One-Time Access Token Login
Summary
A weaker authentication method (OTA token or signup token) is accepted as passkey step-up proof, yielding unauthorized renewable 30-day OIDC refresh tokens for clients explicitly configured with RequiresReauthentication: true. The POST /api/webauthn/reauthenticate endpoint's access-token fallback checks only JWT freshness (IssuedAt within 60 seconds), not the authentication method used. The session cookie gate is also non-validating -- any arbitrary cookie value (e.g. session=deadbeef) is accepted, collapsing the reauth boundary to token recency alone.
The bypass needs to succeed only once. The resulting OIDC grant includes a 30-day refresh token that can be rotated indefinitely, providing persistent victim-impersonation access to the protected downstream service. The attacker obtains access_token (1-hour TTL), id_token (victim's name, email, profile), and refresh_token (30-day TTL, renewable) for a client that was explicitly configured to require passkey step-up authentication. The attacker can perform victim-scoped actions at the downstream relying party indefinitely.
Root Cause
CreateReauthenticationTokenWithAccessToken (webauthn_service.go:362-403) only checks that the access token's IssuedAt claim is less than 60 seconds old:
// webauthn_service.go:378-381
tokenExpiration, ok := token.IssuedAt()
if !ok || time.Since(tokenExpiration) > time.Minute {
return "", &common.ReauthenticationRequiredError{}
}
It does not check HOW the user originally authenticated. The reauthenticateHandler (webauthn_controller.go:179-207) falls into this path whenever the request body cannot be parsed as a WebAuthn credential assertion:
// webauthn_controller.go:189-199
credentialAssertionData, err := protocol.ParseCredentialRequestResponseBody(c.Request.Body)
if err == nil {
token, err = wc.webAuthnService.CreateReauthenticationTokenWithWebauthn(...)
} else {
// FALLBACK: Only checks access token age, not auth met
Details
Original advisory: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hp74-gm6m-2qm5
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