GHSA-pgwh-4jj4-qm8v: Flyto2 Core: Multiple HTTP-family modules fetch client-controlled URLs without the SSRF guard their siblings apply (SSRF to internal/metadata)

Summary Numerous HTTP-emitting modules (core.api.http_get, core.api.http_post, graphql.query/graphql.mutation, monitor.http_check, communication.slack_send, notification.{discord,slack,teams}.send_message, ai.vision_analyze [anthropic path], verify.visual_diff, browser.proxy_rotate, and the agent/llm inline base_url branch) perform outbound requests to a fully client-controlled URL without calling the project's own SSRF guard (validate_url_with_env_config) that their sibling modules apply. An authenticated workflow-author can point the URL at the cloud metadata IP (169.254.169.254), a loopback/RFC1918 host, or any internal host and read the response, yielding cloud-metadata credential theft and internal service read/write. Root Cause The SSRF guard is per-module (there is NO global egress interception). Each module must call validate_url_with_env_config before issuing a request. The listed modules never call it — they only carry an ssrf_protected metadata tag string which enforces nothing. Exemplar: src/core/modules/third_party/developer/http/requests.py — grepping for validate_url|ssrf|is_private in requests.py returns 0 guard calls; session.get(url) fires at :85 (HTTPGetModule) and session.post at :188 (HTTPPostModule). SECURITY.md incorrectly lists api.http_get as SSRF-protected. Impact Readable SSRF: full {status_code, headers, body} returned to the caller (requests.py:96-108). Enables theft of cloud IAM credentials from the metadata endpoint and read/write access to internal-only APIs. Scope Changed (S:C) — the request crosses into cloud-metadata / internal-network authority the workflow layer does not otherwise have. Proof of Concept Verified live this session: core.api.http_get with url pointed at a loopback internal server returned the internal body INTERNAL-SECRET-IAM-CREDENTIALS, while the guarded sibling http.get returned NETWORK_ERROR: Hostname blocked: 127.0.0.1 on the same input — proving the branch-asymmetry is real (not a port artifact). POST /mc