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GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc: CloudTAK: Authenticated full-read SSRF in the /api/esri* routes — user-controlled URL fetched with no IP-classification guard

highCVE-2026-55177
Authenticated full-read SSRF in CloudTAK /api/esri* routes — user-controlled URL fetched with no IP-classification guard Summary Every route in the ESRI helper family (api/routes/esri.ts) takes a fully attacker-controlled URL from the request (POST /api/esri body url, and the portal / server / layer query parameters on the GET /api/esri/* routes) and passes it into EsriBase / EsriProxyPortal / EsriProxyServer / EsriProxyLayer in api/lib/esri.ts, which fetch it with the bare fetch from @tak-ps/etl. No IP / DNS / hostname classification is applied at any point, so the destination is never validated against private, loopback, or link-local ranges. Any authenticated user (the routes only require Auth.is_auth(config, req, { anyResources: true }), i.e. any token, not an admin) can therefore make the CloudTAK server issue arbitrary outbound GET/POST requests to internal addresses such as the cloud instance-metadata service (169.254.169.254), loopback admin ports (127.0.0.1:<port>), and other hosts reachable only from inside the deployment VPC. This is a full-read SSRF, not blind: on success the upstream JSON body is returned to the caller via res.json(...), and on failure the upstream error string is reflected verbatim as ESRI Server Error: <message>. An attacker can read cloud metadata (and the temporary IAM credentials the instance role exposes), enumerate internal services, and exfiltrate their response bodies. The sniff() URL classifier provides no protection: it only pattern-matches the *pathname* (/rest, /arcgis/rest, /sharing/rest), so a URL like http://169.254.169.254/arcgis/rest or http://127.0.0.1:8500/rest passes sniff() and is fetched. Affected versions - All versions up to and including 13.7.0 (latest at time of report). The project already ships an SSRF guard helper — isSafeUrl from @tak-ps/node-safeurl — and wires it into the basemap, task, and video-service code paths, but the entire /api/esri* route family and the ESRI fetch library (api/lib/esri.t

Details

Source
GitHub Security Advisories (INTL · database · site)
Severity
high
Published
2026-07-17
Last updated
2026-07-17
Exploitation
Not in CISA KEV at last sync

Original advisory: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc

Referenced CVEs

CVECSIRTS overviewExternal
CVE-2026-55177coverage & exploitation statusNVD · CVE.org

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