GHSA-v42f-v8xc-j435: Budibase: SSRF via DNS rebinding in the REST datasource integration
Summary
Budibase's central outbound-fetch guard (fetchWithBlacklist) prevents SSRF/DNS-rebinding by resolving the target hostname, checking every resolved IP against the blacklist, and pinning the connection to the validated IP. The pin is implemented as a Node http(s).Agent (makePinnedAgent). The fix for CVE-2026-54353 relies on this pin to stop DNS rebinding.
The REST datasource integration (@budibase/server) calls fetchWithBlacklist but performs the actual request with undici's fetch. undici does not support the Node agent option — it is silently ignored — and instead uses its own dispatcher, which re-resolves the hostname's DNS at connection time. As a result, the validated/pinned IP is never used on the REST datasource path, and the DNS-rebinding protection that CVE-2026-54353 added is silently defeated for the single most-used outbound path in Budibase.
An authenticated user who can configure/run a REST datasource (e.g. a builder/tenant) can use a rebinding hostname (public IP during validation, internal IP at connect) to make the server issue arbitrary, full-response HTTP requests to internal-only services — cloud metadata (IAM credential theft), the internal CouchDB/Redis/MinIO, and other internal endpoints — reading and, because REST datasources allow arbitrary method/body, writing or destroying internal data.
Details
The guard pins the validated IP via a Node agent — packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts:
- resolveSafePinnedIp(url) resolves the hostname and checks every address against isBlacklisted, returning a single pinnedIp (lines ~39–53).
- makePinnedAgent(url, ip) builds a Node http.Agent/https.Agent whose lookup always returns pinnedIp, so a node-fetch connection can only reach the validated IP (lines ~55–68).
- fetchWithBlacklist passes that agent into the request: fetchFn(nextUrl, { ...nextRequest, agent: makePinnedAgent(nextUrl, pinnedIp) }) (lines ~186–192). Each redirect hop is re-validated and re-pinned in the loop.
The REST in
Details
Original advisory: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v42f-v8xc-j435
More from GitHub Security Advisories
- mediumGHSA-jr6p-8pjj-mfx6: Capsule has an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-22872: TenantResource RawItems and Generators s…2026-07-31
- mediumGHSA-68cj-mvg9-rgm2: Capsule: CapsuleConfiguration NodeMetadata regex fields lack webhook validation, allowing…2026-07-31
- mediumGHSA-ff84-5f28-78qj: re2: Out-of-bounds heap read in `exec`/`test`/`match` via attacker-influenced `lastIndex`…2026-07-31
- mediumGHSA-6hxr-mr5r-9836: re2: Global `String.prototype.match` with an empty-matchable pattern never advances → inf…2026-07-31
- mediumGHSA-x83g-979r-f5fh: Sylius Mollie Plugin has unauthenticated IDOR that leaks order token and customer PII2026-07-31