GHSA-v56q-mh7h-f735: Immutable.js `List` 32-bit trie overflow → unrecoverable DoS
Summary
List#set, List#setSize, List#setIn, List#updateIn (and the functional set / setIn / updateIn) mishandle an index or size in the range [2 30, 2 31):
- On an empty List the operation enters an uncatchable infinite loop (a tight CPU spin; a surrounding try/catch never regains control). Only killing the worker recovers it.
- On a populated List (≥ 32 elements — i.e. any array of ≥ 32 items turned into a List by fromJS) the loop allocates without bound → heap exhaustion → the process aborts (SIGABRT, exit 134, or kernel OOM-kill 137). A real crash, not a recoverable error.
The index may be a numeric string, so it can come straight from a request body, URL, or key-path. A single small unauthenticated request is enough.
There is also a companion silent data-corruption issue in setSize:
List([1, 2, 3]).setSize(2 31); // before fix => size 0 (silently cleared)
List([1, 2, 3]).setSize(2 32 + 5); // before fix => size 5 (huge value wraps to 5)
Impact
Availability only. A reachable configuration is any endpoint that routes untrusted input into a List index or a setIn/updateIn key-path — which the extremely common state = fromJS(body); state.setIn(userPath, value) pattern does (config stores, document/collection editors, redux-immutable reducers, JSON-Patch endpoints, etc.).
No confidentiality or integrity impact, no RCE. The companion setSize bug can silently corrupt application state (wrong size) without crashing.
Reproduction (immutable 5.1.7)
import { fromJS, List } from 'immutable';
// 1) Populated List: OOM -> process abort (SIGABRT, exit 134) within ~2s
fromJS({ items: new Array(64).fill(0) }).setIn(['items', '1073741824'], 'x');
// 2) Empty List: hangs forever, uncatchable
List().set(2 30, 'x');
// 3) Silent truncation
List([1, 2, 3]).setSize(2 31); // => size 0
List([1, 2, 3]).setSize(2 32 + 5); // => size 5
A remote 43-byte HTTP request ({"path":["items","1073741824"],"value":"x"}) is sufficient to abort a worker that applies it via state = state.
Details
Original advisory: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v56q-mh7h-f735
Exploitation outlook
EPSS (FIRST.org) estimates each CVE’s probability of exploitation in the next 30 days — here is the CSIRTS.com read on those numbers.
- Low exploitation riskCVE-2026-598790.44% 30-day exploitation probability — currently an unlikely target, but scores change as exploit code circulates. Riskier than 36% of all scored CVEs.
Referenced CVEs
| CVE | CSIRTS overview | External |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-59879 | coverage & exploitation status | NVD · CVE.org |
Same CVEs, other sources
How other CERTs, PSIRTs and databases cover the vulnerabilities in this advisory.
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