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GHSA-v82g-2437-67m2: vLLM: Speech-to-text upload size limit is enforced after full UploadFile read

mediumCVSS 6.5CVE-2026-55646
Summary Current-head vLLM documents VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_CLIP_FILESIZE_MB as the maximum audio file size accepted by the speech-to-text APIs. The default is 25 MB. vllm/envs.py also describes files larger than this value as rejected. The /v1/audio/transcriptions and /v1/audio/translations routes call await request.file.read() before vLLM checks that limit. In FastAPI and Starlette, UploadFile.read() returns bytes from the uploaded file object; when called without a size argument, the route materializes the remaining file contents. vLLM then performs the compressed file-size check later in _preprocess_speech_to_text() against the already-created bytes object. As a result, the documented compressed audio file-size limit does not bound the memory allocated by vLLM endpoint code before validation. An oversized multipart upload can cause vLLM to allocate memory proportional to the uploaded file size before rejecting the request as too large. This is distinct from GHSA-6pr9-rp53-2pmc, which covered decoded PCM expansion after compressed input was accepted. This report covers compressed upload materialization before compressed-size validation. Technical Details The upload routes perform an unbounded read before vLLM checks the documented compressed audio file-size limit: - vllm/entrypoints/speech_to_text/transcription/api_router.py: audio_data = await request.file.read() - vllm/entrypoints/speech_to_text/translation/api_router.py: audio_data = await request.file.read() - vllm/entrypoints/speech_to_text/base/serving.py later checks: if len(audio_data) / 1024**2 > self.max_audio_filesize_mb There is no route-level check of request.file.size, Content-Length, a bounded read(max_bytes + 1), or a streaming copy that stops at the configured limit before the full file is materialized. This does not appear to be intended behavior. vLLM's security guide treats request-controlled resource use as a security boundary: for example, requests that exceed VLLM_MAX_N_SEQUENCES are reject

Details

Source
GitHub Security Advisories (INTL · database · site)
Severity
medium — CVSS 6.5
Published
2026-07-17
Last updated
2026-07-17
Exploitation
Not in CISA KEV at last sync

Original advisory: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v82g-2437-67m2

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Referenced CVEs

CVECSIRTS overviewExternal
CVE-2026-55646coverage & exploitation statusNVD · CVE.org

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