GHSA-vqrw-qphh-p34v: TAK-PS-Stats Web UI: Authenticated full-read SSRF in CloudTAK basemap import (PUT /api/basemap) — no IP-classification guard
Summary
PUT /api/basemap (the basemap import endpoint) fetches an attacker-supplied URL server-side with no SSRF protection whatsoever. Any authenticated user can submit a JSON body { "type": "...", "url": "<attacker url>" }; the server calls fetch(url) against that URL and then reflects the response body (name, attribution, tiles[0], zoom levels) back to the caller in the OptionalTileJSON response.
Because there is no IP-address classification, internal-only services are reachable: cloud metadata (http://169.254.169.254/...), loopback (http://127.0.0.1/...), RFC1918 ranges, and CGNAT. The response body flows back to the attacker, making this a full-read SSRF (not blind): the attacker reads the internal HTTP response verbatim. This enables theft of cloud instance credentials, internal service enumeration, and reading of internal-only HTTP endpoints from the network position of the CloudTAK API server.
The only URL check in the basemap protocol layer (BasemapProtocol.isValidURL, api/lib/interface-basemap.ts) validates the scheme is http/https only and performs no host/IP filtering — and the import path does not even call it; it goes straight from new URL(rawURL) to fetch(url).
Three independent bypass classes were confirmed end-to-end against a real deployed build:
1. Direct internal/loopback IP literals.
2. Alternate IP encodings (e.g. decimal http://2130706433/ = 127.0.0.1).
3. Redirect following — fetch uses the default redirect: 'follow', so even a public initial host that 302-redirects to an internal address is followed with no re-validation.
Vulnerable code (file:line)
api/routes/basemap.ts — importBasemapURL() and the PUT /basemap handler (line numbers at commit 90d43bdd2fb7d9bd57cbce28c709d9e5207a475a):
https://github.com/dfpc-coe/CloudTAK/blob/64bc1886ff56b62f53d765d69ac90ff9fc23b54b/api/routes/basemap.ts#L68-L136
// api/routes/basemap.ts
async function importBasemapURL(
config: Config,
rawURL: string,
auth?: Static<typeof BasemapImportAuth>,
): Prom
Details
Original advisory: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vqrw-qphh-p34v
Referenced CVEs
| CVE | CSIRTS overview | External |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-54546 | coverage & exploitation status | NVD · CVE.org |
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