CSIRTS // UNIFIED SECURITY ADVISORY FEEDSYS ● ONLINE · POWERED BY INTELFUSIONS.COM

GHSA-w6h2-fr4q-xvxv: PraisonAI: Compute-bridged file tools allow shell command injection

highCVSS 8.8CVE-2026-57117
Compute-bridged file tools allow shell command injection Summary LocalManagedAgent / SandboxedAgent compute bridging wraps read_file, list_files, and write_file when a compute provider is attached. The bridge converts those file operations into shell command strings using raw path arguments, then sends those strings to shell-backed compute providers. An attacker who can influence a file-tool path argument can break out of the quoted path and execute arbitrary shell commands in the compute environment. With compute="local", commands execute through the local subprocess compute provider on the host. With Docker, commands execute in the container. Affected Product - Repository: MervinPraison/PraisonAI - Package: praisonai - Component: src/praisonai/praisonai/integrations/managed_local.py - Confirmed affected: - v4.6.10 - v4.6.56 - v4.6.57 - current main at 2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1 - Confirmed not affected: - v4.6.9 - v4.6.1 - v4.5.149 - Suggested affected range: >= 4.6.10, <= 4.6.57 Root Cause Current managed_local.py defines the bridged tool set: compute_bridged_tools = {"execute_command", "read_file", "write_file", "list_files"} For file tools, _bridge_file_tool() constructs shell command strings: command = f'cat "{filepath}"' command = f'ls -la "{directory}"' command = f'cat > "{filepath}" << "EOF"\n{content}\nEOF' The local compute provider executes the string with asyncio.create_subprocess_shell(...); the Docker compute provider executes it with ["sh", "-c", command]. The bridge keeps the low-risk read_file / list_files tool names and signatures while changing their execution primitive into shell interpretation. Why This Is Not Intended Behavior Compute bridging itself is documented and intentional. The vulnerability is that file path data is interpreted as shell syntax. The normal read_file and list_files implementations treat the same payload as a literal path and do not expand shell metacharacters. The approval registry also marks

Details

Source
GitHub Security Advisories (INTL · database · site)
Severity
high — CVSS 8.8
Published
2026-06-18
Last updated
2026-07-20
Exploitation
Not in CISA KEV at last sync

Original advisory: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w6h2-fr4q-xvxv

Referenced CVEs

CVECSIRTS overviewExternal
CVE-2026-57117coverage & exploitation statusNVD · CVE.org

More from GitHub Security Advisories