CSIRTS // UNIFIED SECURITY ADVISORY FEEDSYS ● ONLINE · POWERED BY INTELFUSIONS.COM

GHSA-whvh-wf3x-g77j: JupyterLab: Allowlist/blocklist check in `PyPIExtensionManager.install()` not enforced for direct callers (missing `await`)

low
The extension allowlist/blocklist check inside PyPIExtensionManager.install() was not enforced due to a missing await. For purposes of JupyterLab this was a secondary defense-in-depth check: install() was intended to enforce the allowlist/blocklist itself for any future uses and users calling this method directly (in addition to the separate check handling requests arriving through the HTTP API). The only runtime symptom was a RuntimeWarning: coroutine 'is_install_allowed' was never awaited. This has security implications only for deployments that combine all of the following: - a custom extension or downstream integration that imports PyPIExtensionManager and calls install() directly with a package name influenced by untrusted user input (the stock JupyterLab HTTP handler is not affected - it performs its own awaited allowlist check before calling install()); - an allowlist/blocklist configured with the intent of restricting which packages users can install; - the (default) PyPI Extension Manager enabled; and - kernels and terminals disabled or delegated to remote hosts, so that the custom extension's install() call is the only available package-install vector (otherwise a user with kernel access can install packages directly regardless of this check) Impact Low. No exposure for stock JupyterLab: the HTTP API and Extension Manager UI enforce the listing through a separate, correctly awaited check. The gap affected only custom extensions or downstream integrations that called the public install() method directly and relied on it to self-enforce. Patches JupyterLab v4.6.2 and v4.5.10 contain the patch. Users of applications that depend on JupyterLab, such as Notebook v7+, should update jupyterlab package too. Workarounds No action is required for deployments that only expose extension management through the JupyterLab HTTP API / Extension Manager UI, as that path was already enforcing the listing via the handler's own check. Deployments wanting to disable pro

Details

Source
GitHub Security Advisories (INTL · database · site)
Severity
low
Published
2026-07-22
Last updated
2026-07-22
Exploitation
Not in CISA KEV at last sync

Original advisory: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-whvh-wf3x-g77j

More from GitHub Security Advisories