GHSA-x77v-q46j-393g: Gitea: Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim
Summary
When [oauth2_client] UPDATE_AVATAR = true is enabled, Gitea fetches the avatar URL received from an OAuth2/OIDC provider using Go's default HTTP client. The URL comes from the user's OAuth/OIDC avatar value, commonly the OIDC picture claim.
The affected code path calls http.Get(url) without applying outbound host or IP restrictions. A low-privileged user who can influence their own picture claim under an already-configured OAuth2/OIDC source can cause the Gitea server to make arbitrary outbound HTTP GET requests. This includes requests to loopback addresses, RFC 1918 private network addresses, and IPv4 link-local addresses such as 169.254.169.254.
This is a blind SSRF by default. Impact can increase in deployments where the Gitea host can reach cloud metadata services, localhost-only services, or internal services that return valid image data.
Details
The vulnerable sink is in routers/web/auth/oauth.go:
func oauth2UpdateAvatarIfNeed(ctx *context.Context, url string, u *user_model.User) {
if setting.OAuth2Client.UpdateAvatar && len(url) > 0 {
resp, err := http.Get(url)
if err == nil {
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
}
if err == nil && resp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK {
data, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, setting.Avatar.MaxFileSize+1))
if err == nil && int64(len(data)) <= setting.Avatar.MaxFileSize {
_ = user_service.UploadAvatar(ctx, u, data)
}
}
}
}
The caller is in routers/web/auth/oauth_signin_sync.go:
func oauth2SignInSync(ctx *context.Context, authSourceID int64, u *user_model.User, gothUser goth.User) {
oauth2UpdateAvatarIfNeed(ctx, gothUser.AvatarURL, u)
...
}
gothUser.AvatarURL is derived from the OAuth2/OIDC provider's avatar value. For OIDC providers, this is commonly populated from the picture claim returned by the provider's userinfo endpoint or ID token.
The issue is that this value can be attacker-influenced in some common IdP configurations, while Gitea fetches it server-side using http.Get with no host/IP validat
Details
Original advisory: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x77v-q46j-393g
Referenced CVEs
| CVE | CSIRTS overview | External |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-23603 | coverage & exploitation status | NVD · CVE.org |
Same CVEs, other sources
How other CERTs, PSIRTs and databases cover the vulnerabilities in this advisory.
- high[NEW] [high] Gitea: Multiple vulnerabilitiescert-bund
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