CVE-2026-50268
Summary
Configuring encrypt:rsa:algorithm=OAEP does not enable OAEP encryption. Due to an incorrect BouncyCastle transformation string, the OAEP setting selects PKCS#1 v1.5, which is the same algorithm as the DEFAULT setting.
Impact
Operators who configure encrypt:rsa:algorithm=OAEP to obtain CCA2-secure padding receive PKCS#1 v1.5 instead. Currently, Decrypt() is called only against operator-controlled configuration data, so no exploitable path exists, but any future code path that exposes a decryption oracle would be Bleichenbacher-vulnerable despite the OAEP setting.
Migration note
Existing {cipher} values produced under the broken OAEP setting were encrypted with PKCS#1 v1.5. The fix makes OAEP use actual OAEP padding, so those values will fail to decrypt after upgrading. Re-encrypt all affected {cipher} values after upgrading.
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Exploitation outlook
- Low exploitation risk0.05% 30-day exploitation probability — currently an unlikely target, but scores change as exploit code circulates. Riskier than 0% of all EPSS-scored CVEs.
Advisory coverage (1)
- lowGHSA-4j9m-h44m-2hv8: Steeltoe: OAEP setting silently selects PKCS#1 v1.5 paddingghsa · 2026-07-02
External references
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