CVE-2026-55553
Summary
urllib supports redirect-following through followRedirect, which is expected behavior for an HTTP client. The issue is that, when following a redirect to a different origin, urllib preserves the caller-supplied request headers verbatim, including credential-bearing headers such as Authorization, Cookie, Proxy-Authorization, and custom auth headers (x-api-key, x-auth-token, x-access-token).
If the redirect target is attacker-controlled or outside the trust boundary of the original target, credentials intended for the original origin can be delivered to the redirected origin. In a local multi-library reproduction, urllib v4.9.0 was the only tested client that stripped no headers on cross-origin redirect.
Affected behavior
Confirmed against urllib v4.9.0. The relevant code is in #requestInternal (src/HttpClient.ts:639-656):
// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Redirections
if (RedirectStatusCodes.includes(res.statusCode) && maxRedirects > 0 && requestContext.redirects < maxRedirects) {
if (res.headers.location) {
requestContext.redirects++;
const nextUrl = new URL(res.headers.location, requestUrl.href);
// Ensure the response is consumed
await response.body.arrayBuffer();
debug(
'Request#%d got response, status: %s, headers: %j, timing: %j, redirect to %s',
requestId,
res.status,
res.headers,
res.timing,
nextUrl.href,
);
return await this.#requestInternal(nextUrl.href, options, requestContext);
}
}
The recursive call this.#requestInternal(nextUrl.href, options, requestContext) reuses the original options object. If the caller supplied credential-bearing headers in options.headers, those headers are reused for the redirected request, regardless of whether the redirect target shares the original origin.
Redirect-header handling context
The CHANGELOG suggests that redirect-related header handling has been considered before, including changes around preserving or cleaning up Host during redirects. Given that context, sensitive-header strippi
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Advisory coverage (2)
External references
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